Exactly the same day; Friday 31st January 2020 ‘The South China Morning Post’ reported that Singapore will close its borders to all new visitors from mainland China, including foreigners who had visited the country in the last 14 days.

Sunday 22nd March 2020, The Mail online reported that flights from Italy, Iran and China, the countries with the largest death tolls from Coronavirus were still landing in the UK bringing with them up to 7,500 passengers a day.

Monday 23rd March 2020 Emperor Johnson had the audacity to address the nation on television and “ORDER’ a lockdown. In his address he stated that people can only shop for basic necessities, should limit exercise to one form a day, restrict travel only to and from essential work and that you should stay at home. HOUSE ARREST in other words.

As of writing the UK death toll is: 1,789

As of writing the Singapore death toll is: 3

These facts show a startling difference in the two countries attitude to the Coronavirus and attitudes to public safety. WHY didn’t the UK government act sooner to stem the flow of potential carriers into the country instead of now locking down its own citizens?

Emperor Johnson has ‘very politely and like the gentlemen he is’ asked the British people to forgo their Human Rights. Around the world, and happening right now in Indonesia, governments are doing the same. We are being told, stay home, saves lives, save the health services, watch meekly as our economies are decimated and millions of lives are ruined because some health experts “THINK!’ but they can’t be sure, that the Coronavirus is a modern Spanish Flu.

Obviously any loss of human life is tragic, but when it is noted that over 98% of cases have underlying conditions and the age of those mostly affected is over 70, then perhaps a new approach is needed.

Case Fatality Rate (CFR)

The media constantly report the Case Fatality Rate (CFR), as if it is the Infection Fatality Rate (IFR), which is unknown because we don’t know accurately in any country how many people have been infected. This is an important difference. CFR is the number of people who have died, divided by the total number of people diagnosed with the disease. To get the IFR you need total deaths and total cases.

Italy has the one of the oldest populations in Europe. Seasonal flu epidemics always hit Italy very hard. In the 2016-17 Influenza season 24,981 deaths were attribute to the disease. It has been demonstrated that COVID-19 is particularly dangerous to the very elderly and to those with comorbidities. This is why CFR varies so widely from country to country.

Italy has been on total lockdown and still they are one of the worst affected countries in the world. It is true to say that all Novel viruses (those not seen before) are of particular concern and the Novel Coronavirus, COVID-19 is no different. It is a serious threat to health that should be taken seriously, but not at the expense of economies, jobs and people’s long term security. This is a medicine that is worse than the disease as Trump said.

Other pandemics have happened throughout recent history and governments have never in unison closed down their economies and industry and told their citizens to stay at home, while they use their Government reserves and print debt to bail out the very economies they are ruining.

A different approach then must be considered that allows for public health to be protected and proportionately to the risk as it presents itself in quantifiable data. As of writing just over 40,000 people have died from COVID-19 directly or for comorbidity reasons.

We live in a world of 7.8 Billion people. 40,000 equates to 0.0005 of the world’s population. When you look at the figures like that and realise that people are always dying from a multitude of causes and governments can’t possibly stop the world every time a virus appears, then you start to wonder why they are all doing it this time. Is this virus truly so deadly. If that is the case, then why don’t the figures bear this out.

Death is part of the rhythm of life and the inevitable journey for us all. What is important on this journey is the quality of life and the peace and security we can enjoy. What nearly all governments are doing right now, herded like lemmings by a voracious media is putting millions of people lives in economic jeopardy, either deliberately or for an agenda that they are not sharing with us.

Knowing what we do about the COVID-19 and the fact that it will spread, regardless of what governments do, then surely the best way forward is trace and quarantine, and not on-mass house arrest and destruction of economies and peoples livelihoods.

Clearly identifiable is that the older the population, the more destructive the virus is to that population. Those with impaired immune systems are also far more at risk. Would a measured approach then be of more long term benefit.

Those 70 years and older should be advised to practise more extreme social distancing until vaccinations and treatments are developed. Those beneath this age should be educated to practise good sanitary habits, and just like in Indonesia, Japan and Singapore; wear a face mask when you are sick, and not to prevent sickness.

No reliable data exists on the spread of Coronavirus in asymptomatic individuals but through most viruses this is typically low.

In Indonesia a tiny percent of the population are over 70 years of age. This doesn’t mean they shouldn’t take precautions and protect the vulnerable, but in such a young country, I believe it would be unwise to turn off the engine of the economy. More harm than good will be achieved.

In the UK Boris Johnson has actually contracted COVID-19 and I am certain we all wish him a speedy recovery. I am also certain that he will be back in full force shortly. A healthy man shrugging off a virus.

This is normal. COVID-19 is a nasty virus, especially to the old and infirm. It should be treated as such and precautions taken. Nothing, however, about this virus currently merits the Draconian measure taken and the hysteria whipped up by a compliant media.

On this April 1st, let us not be fools and give away our freedoms based on the edicts of autocrats, and without any public consultation. This is not government. It is fealty. The right to liberty and public assembly should be protected vigorously. The right to movement also is important, although the UK has yet to pass this into law.

I am certain Boris Johnson means well. I genuinely believe he wants the best for the UK as President Jokowi does for Indonesia. But in both cases, and that of COVID-19, could it be that the Emperor has no clothes?

“Disclaimer: The author takes full responsibility on the content of this opinion and is also not part of the PinterPolitik.com editorial responsibility.”

Its findings have been echoed by a range of other research, and although autocratic-leaning populists had mixed results in elections in 2018 – and might struggle to maintain power this year in important states like India — they are not going away anytime soon. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is likely to consolidate his power in upcoming midterm elections. Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is undermining Mexican democratic institutions, going around institutions via referenda and other means, packing the courts, and taking other measures. Populist parties performed relatively well in Thailand’s recent elections, although the military appears likely to prevent a populist coalition from controlling parliament. A far right, populist party seems to be gaining ground in Spain, one of the last western European states not to have a large far right movement.

Meanwhile, the most powerful authoritarian states, such as China, are becoming more repressive, and more globally influential, while leading democracies, including Indonesia, are far less interested in democracy promotion outside their borders. The Jokowi administration, for instance, has not played as large a role in regional and global democracy promotion as its predecessor, the Yudhoyono administration. With a few exceptions in recent years, like Malaysia and possibly Ethiopia, countries that recently have seemed ready to shed autocratic governments have backslid, with repressive regimes crushing political change in places like Cambodia and Egypt or newly elected leaders failing to support the growth of democratic institutions, as in Myanmar, where a potentially promising democratic transition, in 2015 and early 2016, appears to have foundered.

Even in Indonesia, still one of the more successful examples of democratization in recent years, cracks have appeared in the process of political transition, including the growth of massive patronage politics, or “democracy for sale,” and a retreat, in Jakarta, from commitments to Indonesia’s secular foundations. Indonesia still remains a much more solid democracy than any other country in Southeast Asia, but it faces significant political hurdles.

Amidst this gloom, a fascinating new article, based on groundbreaking new research, suggests that the global retreat of democracy is actually worse than it appears, even to some of its most pessimistic observers. In an article for Democratization, Anna Luhrmann and Staffan Lindberg of the University of Gothenburg, who base their conclusions on the V-Dem, or Varieties of Democracy, Project’s findings, argue that a “third wave of autocratization” (following the world’s two previous autocratic waves last century), or a move away from democracy, is actually affecting more democracies than was commonly thought, although usually through gradual reversals, with legal facades, rather than an abrupt democratic reversal like a coup. (I was a contributor to the V-Dem project briefly.) V-Dem is a project that uses a comprehensive, multidimensional dataset of various indicators to measure democracy in a broad range of countries, and has amassed more data on democracy than nearly any other organization.

The V-Dem project further has found that this global democratic backsliding began earlier than the mid- to late-2000s, which is when many democracy experts have traced the start of the current regression. The authors argue, in fact, that the current authoritarian resurgence actually began as early as 1994—a theory that suggests this wave of autocratization is far longer than previously imagined, and more difficult to stem, although many of the states regressing today do not revert into as brutal autocracies as in the past. Yet because so much of this backsliding was gradual, and not abrupt, it often has escaped initial notice. In addition, these types of gradual regressions, frequently cloaked in legal shifts and happening while flawed elections continue to take place—and lacking any Reichstag fire type catalytic event—have made it harder for domestic opponents of autocratization to mobilize against the growing repression.

For instance, in the Philippines recently, backsliding began after Duterte was elected, but he has not launched a coup, or overseen some other complete, dramatic hijacking of democracy. Instead, the president has managed a subversion of institutions like the top court, a crackdown on press freedom, and, now, the possibility of installing a dynastic transition in the country.

Even worse, the V-Dem lead investigators find that, while these gradual processes of democratic erosion are not as abrupt and severe as reversals like coups, they still almost always result in the death of democracy. Of the recent democratic erosions they studied, the note, only 15 percent were halted before democracy broke down—in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, South Korea, and tiny Vanuatu, although some other democratic breakdowns, like in Brazil, are still in progress and with the potential outcomes uncertain. Overall, this is grim news for democracy, indeed.

A version of this article was originally published by the Council on Foreign Relations and can be accessed at:

https://www.cfr.org/blog/state-global-democracy-today-even-worse-it-looks-v-dems-new-democracy-research

From Crisis to Crisis

Thailand, a democracy for most of the 1990s and early 2000s, has in the past decade had two military coups (in 2006 and 2014), violent street protests, a standoff in which the army and vigilantes killed at least ninety people in Bangkok (2010), and a lengthy insurgency in the southernmost provinces. Though the Thai army seemed to accept civilian rule in the 1990s and early 2000s, it once again regularly intervenes in politics and considers itself, along with the monarchy, the bedrock of national stability.

The coups ousted populist political parties linked to Thaksin Shinawatra, long the country’s dominant political figure. The army has more recently overseen the passage of a constitution and other laws designed to entrench its power. The constitution makes it harder for any one party—such as Thaksin’s Puea Thai Party—to win a majority of seats in the lower house of parliament. A party allied to Thaksin, the Thai Raksa Chart Party, will likely be banned from the election. The army and its supporters maintain their political base in Bangkok, creating a divide between the capital and the rural north and northeast, Puea Thai’s base. The army previously worked in concert with the monarch, but under Thailand’s new king the monarchy has increasingly dominated the army, taking direct control of the Crown Property Bureau(a state agency that controls some $30 billion in assets), reshuffles in the armed forces, and other major issues.

Thailand’s elected politicians are not blameless. Although Thaksin and his successors have won every election since 2001, in office they often further corroded democratic institutions. Thaksin launched a brutal war on drugs during his time in office (2001–2006) that reportedly resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings.

Free and Fair Elections?

The election itself will probably be relatively free, but despite considerable popular excitement, the road to election day has not been fair. Thailand’s junta has created a highly repressive environment, restricting online discourse and detaining activists, opposition politicians, academics, and writers. Still, Puea Thai reportedly remains the most popular political party.

Military Maneuvers

No matter who wins, Thailand will likely remain in political crisis. If Puea Thai and its allies gain control of the lower house of parliament, the military and its allies will likely respond harshly. They could use the courts or the bureaucracy to weaken a pro-Thaksin coalition and jail its leaders. These are tactics the army and its allies have used in the past.

Though the army’s favored parties are unlikely to win a majority in the lower house, they could maneuver after the election to get many small parties to back them—and then make junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha prime minister. In this scenario, Thailand would have essentially a democratic facade, behind which the military and the king remain the true powers. If pro-military parties succeed in this maneuvering, it could cause blowback from Puea Thai backers’s. Either scenario could trigger violence among supporters of Puea Thai and other pro-Thaksin parties.

High Stakes

Continued unrest would harm regional stability and U.S. interests; Thailand is a treaty ally of the United States, as well as a leading trading partner and a regional hub for many of its agencies. Political instability would also hamper efforts to suppress the southern insurgency, which has killed some seven thousand people since the early 2000s.

Political inconsistency in the kingdom scares off investors, yet new investment is necessary for Thailand to modernize its economy. The government’s tilt toward authoritarianism provides an opportunity for Beijing to bolster its diplomatic and defense links with Bangkok.

Recent weeks have demonstrated that behind any facade of democracy, the monarchy has grown more influential in Thai politics, as Eugenie Merieau of the University of Gottingen has noted. Thailand’s kings have always played a significant role in politicsdespite theoretically being constrained by the constitution. But the king now has amassed far greater political, military, economic, and religious power, undermining the prospects for a return to pluralistic democracy no matter what happens in March.

This article was originally published by the Council on Foreign Relations and can be accessed at:

https://www.cfr.org/blog/southeast-asia-recap-2018-democracy-continues-suffer

And even in Indonesia, one of the freest states in the region, the Jokowi government has given off worrying signs of increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Jokowi has politicized top law enforcement posts, overseen criminal investigations of opponents, and shown other worrying signs, according to an analysis of his growing authoritarianism published in New Mandala by Tom Power, a PhD candidate at Australian National University. (Malaysia is a rare bright spot for rights and democracy in Southeast Asia this year—in fact one of the few global bright spots for democracy in 2018.)

Perhaps nowhere has the increasing crackdown on rights and freedoms in Southeast Asia been more visible than in the area of press freedom. Of the journalists featured on Time magazine’s series of covers of people of the year for 2018, three are from Southeast Asia. Two of those featured are Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, journalists for Reuters who have been jailed in Myanmar, essentially for investigative reporting into aspects of a massacre against the Rohingya. (They are officially charged with breaking the Official Secrets Act.) The two men have already been in jail for a year—despite their trial being decried as a sham by rights organizations and prominent rights advocates—and they face in total seven-year prison sentences.

Suu Kyi has defended their jailing, and the two reporters’ time in prison is emblematic of Myanmar’s worsening climate for independent journalism, even under Suu Kyi’s government. As the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has noted, three other Myanmar journalists were arrested in October, and overall the Official Secrets Act, defamation charges, and physical threats are chilling the climate for reporting in the country.

The climate for press freedom is poor in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam as well. For example, in Cambodia, one of the leading print outlets, the Cambodia Daily, closed in 2017, reportedly under pressure from the Hun Sen government. Another leading independent outlet, the Phnom Penh Post, was sold to a new owner in 2018, amid worries that the new management would curb critical and investigative reporting. Many Phnom Penh Post staff members quit. Meanwhile, in Vietnam the government continued to aggressively shut down independent bloggers and writers, and Thailand’s junta has continued to harshly repress reporters and editors, such as reportedly pushing for the sacking of the top editor of the Bangkok Post, a leading Thailand newspaper, for his critical coverage of the military regime.

Maria Ressa, the head of Rappler, one of the Philippines’ toughest and most groundbreaking news sites, is probably the best-known case of press freedom under attack in Southeast Asia. Before becoming the CEO of Rappler, Ressa had amassed a broad range of experience, including working for two decades for CNN, for whom she covered everything from the rise of Islamist terror networks in Southeast Asia to the post-Marcos era in the Philippines. She has received a wide range of awards for her work, including an Emmy nomination and an Overseas Press Club award.

Like many authoritarian-leaning populists, Duterte aggressively demonizes the media, and Rappler in particular seems to infuriate him, with its hard-hitting, deep-digging style. The Duterte administration seems determined to put Rappler out of business. In early 2018, the Philippine SEC announced that it was revoking Rappler’s license. The media organization fought, and continued operating, but it was then accused of libel by the Philippine national bureau of investigation, and then was hit with tax evasion charges by the Philippine tax agency.

Ressa herself also was charged with tax evasion, only a few days after she got a press freedom award from CPJ. She and the media outlet deny the charges, and noted how quickly the Philippine government had moved to file charges, seemingly without considering all motions and evidence. The case is now proceeding—but the climate for press freedom in the Philippines, which long combined tough investigative reporting with one of the most dangerous environments for journalists in the world, looks like it will only get grimmer in 2019.

In addition to regression on the issue of press freedom, Southeast Asia witnessed backsliding on rights and freedoms in many other areas in 2018, with Malaysia as a notable exception to this trend.

Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, and even Indonesia exemplified a continued democratic regression. Cambodia destroyed all opposition, although at the end of the year Hun Sen and the CPP, under pressure from foreign governments, slightly relaxed their pressure on the opposition and civil society. However, this relaxation was probably just a means of convincing major foreign donors not to impose tougher sanctions against Cambodia, and not really a shift in how Hun Sen treats the opposition or civil society.

Meanwhile, the Thai junta did everything it could to prevent real political opposition from coalescing. It banned political parties from organizing for most of the time before the February 2019 elections, putting most parties at a disadvantage before the election. The ban was only lifted in December.

In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte cracked down hard on press freedoms. But he also appears to be trying to intimidate other journalism outlets, and has floated plans of launching more extrajudicial killing squads, in addition to those already tasked with wiping out drug suspects – these new squads would purportedly attack anyone linked to a communist insurgent group. Duterte also continued to weaken the independence of the judiciary and the power of the political opposition.

In Laos, where the country’s new leadership has promised to take tough measures to root out graft, there are signs of progress on fighting corruption, including the firing of two provincial governors alleged to have been involved in corruption. But overall, the anti-corruption campaign has made modest inroads at best, and promises by the new leadership to bolster transparency and accountability have had no real effect on what remains a highly authoritarian and opaque government.

And in Myanmar, the National League for Democracy/Aung San Suu Kyi government has proven a massive disappointment, overseeing stalled democratic reforms, regression on press freedoms, and a scorched earth policy toward the Rohingya in western Myanmar.

However, 2019 might not be so grim for rights and freedoms in Southeast Asia. Although Thailand’s junta has tried to stage-manage elections called for February to ensure that the outcome is favorable to the military – and possibly even one resulting in a former general as prime minister – it cannot completely control the actual election.

There is considerable reason to believe that, although the election will not be totally fair – the military is trying to slant the playing field against the long-ruling Puea Thai party – the actual Election Day will be free, marking some progress after nearly five years of military rule. In addition, an election brings some degree of uncertainty, and there is a chance that the vote will result in a parliament that has real authority and popular legitimacy and puts the country back on the path to democratic rule.

There are other potentially hopeful signs in 2019 for rights and freedoms in the region. An election in Indonesia could showcase continued democratic consolidation there, even despite Jokowi’s increasingly authoritarian actions in the past year, and his selection of a cleric as running mate who has, in the past, made harsh statements about a range of minority groups in Indonesia. Malaysia’s government, which has made a strong start on democratic reforms, needs to move quickly to reform the country’s institutions, and set the stage, via legislation, for making lasting inroads against graft. In 2019, the Malaysian government has a chance to push through serious reforms designed to battle corruption, improve government transparency, and protect civil society, showcasing real democratic progress.

This article was originally published by the Council on Foreign Relations and can be accessed at:

https://www.cfr.org/blog/southeast-asia-recap-2018-democracy-continues-suffer

https://www.cfr.org/blog/2018-review-press-freedom-under-assault-southeast-asia-maria-ressa-and-more

Creative Commons: Some Rights Reserved

English Premier League soccer legend Dennis Wise visited Medan recently and I was fortunate enough to host him during his stay.

For those of you unfamiliar with the name; Dennis Wise was captain of Chelsea FC from 1993 to 2000, and in a career spanning over 20 years earned 21 caps for England.

I met Dennis through a mutual friend and when he expressed a desire to see the current state of football in Indonesia, I offered a tour of Persatuan Sepak Bola Medan, commonly referred to as PSMS Medan, which is one of the older Indonesian clubs.

PSMS Medan has an illustrious history dating back to Dutch colonial days when Rumah Susun Football Club and Oost Sumatra Voaetbal Bond played in the 1930s. In 1950, the Dutch Military left Medan and these two clubs merged into the modern PSMS Medan club. The team enjoyed considerable success through the 1950s and 60s, becoming a top club and earning the nickname, “The Killers” with their ‘rap-rap’ style of play which is rough, tough, and persistent. After years of decline, they have finally made back into Liga 1 and plan to recapture their former glory years.

To begin our visit, we were first invited for lunch with the Medan soccer legends who played with the club and the national team during the 1960’s and 1970’s.  At that time Indonesian football had more government support due to the held theory that; “A successful national team makes citizens, who would would otherwise have few opportunities for participation in national politics, identify with the nation.”

This is exemplified by President Sukarno ordering the building of the 100,000 capacity Senayan Stadium in order to host the Fourth Asian Games. The football squad received financial support and access to training facilities years in advance and even at the grass roots, access to a football pitch and a ball were available to many.

This resulted in a respectably good national side.  It wasn’t perfect, but there were football pitches to learn the game on and receive coaching. According to the Medan legends; Parlin Siagian, Noban Kayamuddin, Tunsila, Ismail Ruslan and Suwarno, they had a good team and winning record with a ranking around the late 1920’s in world football and were considered the best in Southeast Asia. They most certainly didn’t have the ranking afforded to the current Indonesian national team. As of today, Indonesia is ranked 162^nd in the World by FIFA.

Given what the Medan legends had told us, how had Indonesian football fallen so far over the decades since they were playing? Not only that, but the Indonesian government has also failed to realize that football is crucial in nation building.

“The paradox that all aspiring nations face is that, to project a sense of national unity and identity on the world stage, they must adjust to an increasingly uniform set of strategies, including good performance in dominant sport.” – Barrie Houlihan, 1997

A Pitch in the Dark

The first thing that struck Dennis was that the players moved around the field without purpose and direction. He could see plenty of talent and technical skills, but all this was going to waste because nobody knew what their job was, and the structure of the team was missing.

Sounds familiar doesn’t it? When you look at Indonesian football as a whole, the first thing to strike you is the amazing disparity between the obvious talent in the country and the success of the national team. Just like the U15’s we were watching they are rudderless and without direction.

Indonesian football has been kicked around politically now for decades and as the government has retreated, corruption has blossomed and the national game has suffered and diminished.

PSSI, the ruling Football Association of Indonesia are continually mired in bribery and match-fixing scandals and have gone through several reincarnations, each time promising professionalism and transparency in the local game. So bad had it become in 2011 that the Ministry of Internal Affairs banned the use of state funds in football following  the anti-graft watchdog accusing  that the PSSI management  of stealing over $50 million from the state budget. The support of the local game has since shifted instead to sponsors and advertisers. This consensus on government support has been given over to the free market.

Effectively now, football in Indonesia has no grassroots pushing the sport forward and no available resources to provide opportunities for those that can’t afford to pay for soccer schools affiliated to local and international clubs.

A local dispute or some political motive or financial motive takes precedent over the general good: a typical example of this is the soccer school in Medan. Speaking with the owner he tells us, the land has been designated for use as a football field only. Although he’s expressed a desire to begin construction for more facilities, he lacks the permission to do so. The school’s many requests to upkeep the pitch and plant fresh grass have been rejected and the condition has deteriorated. They are now involved in a war of attrition, leaving the land unfit as a sports field to train young players.

Future goals for Indonesia

This year Jakarta and Palembang are hosting the Asian Games, while important in the region, they have little impact on the world stage. As I travel extensively around the world, one thing that always strikes me is how little is known of Indonesia. Bali is a name that is always recognised, but Jakarta leaves most nonplussed. Everybody knows Singapore, Bangkok and even Kuala Lumpur, but the powerhouse of Southeast Asia is scarcely known outside the region.

With a successful football team, Indonesia will begin to take its rightful place in the consciousness of world citizens. It will represent the vibrancy, youth and hope of Indonesia. With government and grassroots support, the nation will be able produce the football team we all know the country has the talent to do and which the whole country would like to see.

To underline this, I revert back to my guest in Medan; Dennis Wise. During our visit to SD Pasar Nippon, he did a mini training session with a few of the boys. These were children no more than 6 or 7 years old. When Dennis asked me: Where is the pitch?” I told him: “You’re standing on it!”

He couldn’t believe that concrete was what the kids had as a sport facility. This is where change is needed. More than the problems at the top of football, it is with these kids and kids all around Indonesia, where the future of football lies and where a World Champion Indonesian team is waiting to be discovered.

I leave the last words to Dennis. When I asked him; “What are your thoughts from your visit?”

He replied: “I think Indonesia is a wonderful place, but unfortunately, to help children be a footballer, there’s not enough correct facilities for them to be able to learn and understand how football is taught and how they play.”

I had to ask one more question, so I did. “In Indonesia with its 260 million population; there’s got to be a few Lionel Messi’s wandering around?

“I think they must have. Yes.”

So I asked, “What is the missing key?”

He answered directly.

“The missing key is infrastructure. Without a football field and a ball Indonesian kids are going to find it very, very difficult.”